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SHOULD LABOR BE ALLOWED TO MAKE
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS?
Randall S. Thomas*
Kenneth J. Martin**
Abstract: In this Article, we investigate whether labor unions and related entities should
be permitted to continue to make shareholder proposals using Rule 14a-8 of the federal
securities laws. We focus on the claim that labor is using the shareholder proposal mechanism
to further the interests of workers at the expense of other shareholders. In particular, corporate
management groups have suggested that when labor is involved in collective bargaining
negotiations with management, it should be barred from submitting shareholder proposals
because labor proposals seek to further interests not shared by other security holders of the
company. Using data on shareholder proposals from the 1994 proxy season, we find that labor
union proposals as a whole get as much or more support than do similar proposals made by
other shareholder groups. Furthermore, when we examine a subset of labor union proposals
that have been identified by management groups as instances where labor was acting in its
own self-interest, we find no significant differences between shareholder support for these
proposals and for other shareholders' proposals of a similar nature. We conclude that
regulatory reform is unnecessary.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, organized labor has become one of the most
aggressive proponents of corporate governance reforms at major
American corporations. Unions, union pension funds, individual union
members, and union-oriented investment funds' have seized on the
shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a-8 of the federal securities laws,2 as
their weapon of choice to push for reforms ranging from redemption of
Rights Plans3 to implementation of confidential shareholder voting and
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University. The authors thank Stephen M. Bainbridge, David Baldus, Jonathan C. Carlson, Charles
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Financial Management Association for helpful comments on this draft of the paper. We also wish to
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1. We will refer to these entities collectively as "labor" groups.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997).
3. Rights Plans are one of the most powerful antitakeover defenses available to a target company.
See generally Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When Is
Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 503 (1993). They were originally developed to deter
two-tiered front-end-loaded tender offers that coerced shareholders into tendering into the offer for
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caps on executive pay.4 Much of labor's activism has been aimed at
improving the financial performance of its massive securities portfolios
for the benefit of pensioners and future retirees.' More controversially,
however, labor has targeted some of its shareholder proposals at
companies where it is concurrently engaged in collective bargaining
negotiations or union organizing campaigns.6
fear of receiving a poor price for their shares in the back end of the transaction. See Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). Subsequently, their use has spread to
precluding shareholders from accepting all-cash, all-shares premium-priced tender offers. From the
viewpoint of target management, one very important advantage of Rights Plans is that they can be
adopted without shareholder approval.
4. For recent reports on labor's activism in its role as a shareholder, see Aaron Bernstein, Labor
Flexes Its Muscles-As a Stockholder, Bus. Wk., July 18, 1994, at 79 (stating that union-mounted
proxy fights have quadrupled since 1992); David Cay Johnston, Teamsters Are Challenging GE
ChieFs Compensation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1997, at D2 (discussing Teamster's pension fund's
placement of shareholder resolutions in GE proxy statement for 1997 annual meeting to cap
executive base salaries of top five GE executives at one million dollars); Paul Sweeney, Clash By
Proxy, Across The Board, May 1996, at 21 (discussing labor union activism during 1996 proxy
season); Frank Swoboda, AFL-CIO Changing Its Tactics; Union To Expand Advertising, Corporate
Campaigns Against Employers, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1997, at C2 (announcing AFL-CIO plans to
increase stockholder campaigns against range of employers in 1997 proxy season).
These labor groups also occasionally have launched their own solicitations to force change more
directly. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pittston Co., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,946
(D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989) (discussing labor union solicitation of proxies to obtain shareholder approval
of its proposals without using Rule 14a-8).
For a more complete discussion of labor's current shareholder initiatives, see Stewart J. Schwab &
Randall S. Thomas, Reinventing Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, 96
Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming Feb. 1998). One startling characteristic of the current labor actions is the
number of labor-sponsored independent solicitations of shareholders seeking shareholder approval of
actions without resort to the company's proxy statement. A number of difficult legal issues are raised
by these solicitations and the company's opposition to them. For example, if the company knows
that labor groups are going to solicit shareholders before the annual meeting, but the labor groups
have not done so at the time the company issues its annual meeting proxy materials to shareholders,
can the company send out the materials without mentioning the impending labor solicitation and
then exercise discretionary authority to vote the proxy it receives back from shareholders against any
labor proposals that are made at the meeting? See Randall S. Thomas & Catherine T. Dixon, Aranow
& Einhorn on Proxy Contests for Corporate Control § 9.01[E][3] (3d ed. 1998) (discussing SEC
rulings on scope of discretionary authority); Schwab & Thomas, supra; Idaho Power Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, Mar. 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 114545.
5. See, e.g., Judith H. Dobrzynski, Teamsters Hit a Nerve on Directors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22,
1996, at DI (discussing Teamsters pension fund list of 23 least valuable directors and its
implications for corporate goverance reform).
One important question that we do not address in this Article is whether labor's shareholder
proposals have a positive (or negative) effect on the target companies' performance. In research
currently in progress, we are examining the impact of different sponsors' shareholder proposals on
various measures of economic performance. We are also examining what factors lead shareholders to
target certain companies and not others.
6. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 4.
Shareholder Proposals by Labor
Corporate management has protested vehemently against this use of
the shareholder proposal rule, claiming that labor groups are engaged in
"corporate campaigns" to win concessions that have nothing to do with
their shareholdings and everything to do with their role as representatives
of workers.7 Business groups have asked Congress to curb labor's use of
the shareholder proposal mechanism, proposing changes in the Securities
and Exchange Commission's (SEC) regulations that would allow
companies to exclude labor-sponsored resolutions from annual proxy
statements! In particular, the American Trucking Association (ATA) has
petitioned the SEC to change its interpretation of Rule 14a-8 so that
corporations can exclude shareholder proposals by labor representatives
at companies that are involved in collective bargaining negotiations or
union organizing campaigns.'
In this Article, we examine whether labor groups should be allowed to
use Rule 14a-8 as a mechanism for pursuing their interests as
shareholders.' We focus on the questions raised by the ATA and
corporate management about labor's potential conflicting roles as
shareholders and representatives of workers. Using data from the 1994
proxy season, we conducted an empirical examination of the differences
between shareholder resolutions proposed by labor groups and those
sponsored by other investors.
7. Corporate campaigns have been described as multi-tactic pressure campaigns directed at a
company (or companies) by a union engaged in collective bargaining, wage disputes, or the protest
of workplace grievances. Id. See infra Part IV.A (further discussing corporate campaigns).
8. See Stephen Baker, The Yelping over Labor's New Tactics, Bus. Wk., Oct. 23, 1995, at 75; see
also Elizabeth Walpole-Hofineister, Corporate Campaigns: Business Leaders Blast Union Tactics;
House Hearings Planned for November, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 22, 1995, available in
Westlaw, BNA-DLR Database (reporting that American Trucking Association had sent letter to SEC
asking that it change its rules to permit companies to refuse to include union-sponsored resolutions
in proxy statements that are submitted in midst of corporate campaign).
9. See Letter from Daniel R. Barney, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, American
Trucking Associations, to Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, & Steven M.N. Walman, SEC
Commissioner I (Sept. 21, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter ATA Letter]. The ATA proposes
that the SEC permit companies to exclude shareholder proposals when:
(a) during or within a defined period in advance of the planned start of collective bargaining at
the company or of the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement (as well as during the
pendency of any administrative or judicial proceedings with respect to either) or when a union
organizing campaign is ongoing, imminent, or threatened; and
(b) the proponent is the union or a member or retiree of the union that is engaged in such
organizing or collective bargaining activities.
Id.
10. We do not address specifically the merits of Rule 14a-8 itself, only its application to labor
shareholder proposals.
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Our analysis focuses on shareholders' perceptions of these proposals
and in particular on the proposals' success in the ballot box. The question
we seek to answer is whether shareholders treat labor proposals
differently from proposals submitted by other shareholders.
Our data set contains 192 shareholder proposals submitted by labor
groups, public institutions, private institutions, and individuals. We
included proposals covering internal and external corporate governance,
compensation, and miscellaneous issues. We estimated regressions for
the fraction of votes cast for a shareholder-sponsored corporate
governance proposal, including independent variables for sponsor,
proposal type, and ownership."
Controlling for the type of proposal and ownership structure, we
found that: (1) labor-sponsored proposals received a statistically signi-
ficant higher percentage of favorable votes than did similar proposals
sponsored by private institutions and individuals; and (2) labor-
sponsored proposals obtained approximately the same percentage of
votes as proposals sponsored by public institutions. We interpret these
results to mean that labor's proposals taken as a whole are viewed by
shareholders as being no different from proposals submitted by other
groups of shareholders.
To further explore these findings, we focused on a subsample of
proposals identified by the ATA as specific instances where labor has
used the proposal mechanism as part of a "corporate campaign." We
found no significant difference between the average percentage of votes
cast for these allegedly "abusive" proposals and the average percentage
of votes cast for all other corporate governance proposals. We did find
that these proposals received an insignificantly lower percentage of
favorable votes than other labor proposals.
Our basic hypothesis is that shareholders will vote in their own self-
interest, and, if they believe that labor is acting against their interests,
they will vote against labor's proposals. We recognize that companies do
not have to disclose the identity of the shareholders who submitted a
proposal unless they wish to do so or are asked by a stockholder to do so
later.'2 If a company does not make this disclosure, then some
shareholders may be unaware of the identity of the proponent, and
therefore may not perceive that the proposal is adverse to their own self-
interest.
11. The ownership variables include the fraction of shares owned by institutional holders and the
fraction of shares owned by insiders.
12. Rule 14a-8(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(2) (1997).
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However, we believe that there are three reasons to think that this is
not a significant problem for our study. First, the company always has
the option of disclosing the shareholder proponent's identity. If
management is opposed to the proposal, and believes that shareholders
would be less inclined to vote in favor of it if they knew labor was
sponsoring the proposal, then they could disclose that the proposal is
being made by labor interests and emphasize this point in the company's
statement in opposition to the proposal.
13
Of course, some shareholders may choose not to read such materials
because they are rationally apathetic. While it seems that truly rational
apathetic shareholders are those who choose not to vote at all, and hence
do not show up in our data (which only measure actual votes received), it
is possible that some shareholders will choose to vote, but avoid reading
the proxy materials (and any other materials) they receive from the
company. Although there is to our knowledge no conclusive evidence on
this point, the more logical conclusion in our eyes is that most
shareholders that vote have decided to become informed, and while they
may not read the entire proxy statement, they are likely to read those
materials that the company highlights as the most important and that bear
on the issues listed on the proxy card, such as a shareholder proposal.
This would certainly be true for institutional shareholders that have
fiduciary obligations to act in an informed manner to benefit their
beneficial participants.
Second, even if management chooses not to make these disclosures,
many shareholders will be aware of the identity of the proponent. This is
especially true in high-profile instances where the press is actively
reporting on a corporate campaign or a contested collective bargaining
situation. As noted previously, the press has become increasingly
interested in covering labor's shareholder initiatives. 4 Even in situations
not widely reported by the press, many institutional investors are
informed about the identity of the proponent through shareholder
13. See Questar Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement, Mar. 18, 1996, at *34, available in Westlaw,
EDGAR Database, Filing 96535686 (setting forth corporation's statement in opposition to United
Food and Commercial Workers Union shareholder proposal seeking to get company to adopt
confidential shareholder voting, in which company tells shareholders that company believes that this
particular shareholder proposal is part of corporate campaign against Albertson's and all other
corporations with links to Albertson's through its directors and officers); see also Union Pacific
Corp., Supplemental Proxy Materials, Apr. 4, 1996, at *2-3, available in Westlaw, EDGAR
Database, Filing 96544406 (corporation's letter to its shareholders urging them not to sign any proxy
card from Teamsters labor union that might be sent to them as part of solicitation effort by union).
14. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 4, for many other examples of press coverage of these
contests.
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organizations, such as the Council of Institutional Shareholder Services
or the Investor Responsibility Research Center.' s
Finally, it may be the case that many institutional shareholders are
indifferent to who sponsors corporate governance proposals because they
have adopted voting policies that dictate they will vote in a certain
manner on all corporate governance proposals of a particular type. In
other words, these shareholders do not care about the identity of the
sponsor of the proposal. All they are interested in is the type of proposal
being made. While this is plainly true for some investors, if these types
of shareholders are uniformly distributed across the companies in our
sample, so that on average relatively equal percentages of shares are held
by these types of shareholders in the companies in our sample, then it
should equally increase support levels for all corporate governance
proposals of these types. It should not affect our results, however, which
show that labor and public institution proposals receive higher levels of
shareholders' support, even after controlling for proposal type.
We interpret these results to suggest that, even in situations in which
labor is battling management over other issues, such as collective
bargaining negotiations, shareholders continue to treat labor proposals as
being no different from those submitted by others. These results suggest
that management's concerns with labor's use of the shareholder proposal
mechanism are overstated and that regulatory reform is unnecessary.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we trace the development
of labor shareholder activism in the United States during the 1980s and
1990s. Part III analyzes Rule 14a-8's application to labor shareholder
proposals. It includes separate discussions on the mechanics of the rule
itself and how the rule is currently being applied by the SEC to labor
proposals. In the latter, we focus primarily on the personal grievance and
ordinary business exclusions. Part IV evaluates current proposals by
corporate management groups to block labor groups from using the
shareholder proposal rule to place issues on the corporate proxy card.
After describing corporate campaigns, we look at a recent management
proposal and some criticisms that have been leveled at it. Finally, in
Part V, we present our empirical analysis of the voting data on
shareholder proposals in 1994.
15. Id.
Vol. 73:41, 1998
Shareholder Proposals by Labor
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR'S SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Labor's shareholder activism grew out of the wave of corporate
takeovers in the 1980s.6 During this period, unions generally supported
corporate management in resisting hostile acquisitions by, among other
things, pushing for stronger state antitakeover laws and accepting
defensive employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). 7 Employee
shareholders also supported a host of other antitakeover devices that
insulated management from the consequences of poor performance. 8
By the end of the 1980s, many companies that had been through
mergers and acquisitions were left with heavy debt loads. 9 Other
companies faced increased competition, both domestic and foreign. As a
result of these and other forces, corporate America went through (and to
some extent is still going through) a series of restructurings with many
companies dramatically downsizing their work forces.2" Corporations
shifted toward using more temporary and part-time workers.21
As corporations changed their structures, locations, and owners,
millions of workers lost their jobs, eroding unions' membership and
strength.' Union membership further declined as workers perceived that
the unions were unable to protect their members from layoffs. Union
16. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1861, 1906 (1995); Patrick S. McGurn,
Growth of Union Activism Is Byproduct of 1980s, IRRC Corp. Governance Bull., Jan./Feb. 1994, at
5, 5. This was not the first time that labor groups had used Rule 14a-8. In the early 1980s, the
American Airlines pilots' union (and some other labor groups) had used it for some very specialized
purposes. Telephone Interview with William Morley, Senior SEC Official (1997).
17. See, e.g., Allen Michel & Israel Shaked, Takeover Madness: Corporate America Fights Back
244-55 (1986) (explaining "Employee Benefit Plan Defense" in context of Dan River's 1982 battle
with Carl Icahn); see also Vineeta Anand, Employee-Shareholders an Angry New Voice, Pensions &
Investments, Apr. 4, 1994, at 26. Anand notes:
[Tihe surge in shareholder activism by employees and labor unions is coming back to haunt
corporations that have put millions of shares in the hands of workers through employee stock
ownership plans, pension finds, or stock option programs since the mid-1980s, reckoning they
could count on employees as allies in hostile takeover bids.
Id.
18. McGurn, supra note 16, at 5 (quoting Teamsters President Ron Carey).
19. IM
20. See id.; see also Is Recovery in Sight? Don't Look at Payrolls, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1991, at
DI (stating that foreign and domestic competition and "huge" debt contributed to rising
unemployment).
21. McGurn, supra note 16, at 5.
22. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and
Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1988).
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membership fell from twenty percent of the total public and private
workforce in 1983 to roughly sixteen percent by 1992.'
In the early 1990s, the fear of corporate takeovers had temporarily
receded. Labor perceived that managers, now insulated from the
consequences of bad policies and poor performance by antitakeover
devices, which labor had supported, were using their power to close
plants, hire permanent replacement workers for striking employees, and
pay themselves exorbitant salaries and benefits. From labor's
perspective, management simultaneously failed to focus on long-term
investments in training, technology, and improved products. Labor grew
increasingly dissatisfied with management's corporate vision.24
Yet, even as the unions' membership declined, its pension funds'
assets increased. During the 1980s and 1990s, there was an extraordinary
rise in union pension assets and employee stockholdings. The number of
jointly-trusteed national and local union plans holding more than one
million dollars in assets reached 1580 in 1993. Together, these funds'
combined assets grew from a total of $55 billion in 1983 to about $216
billion in 1993.25
During the same time period, ESOPs' stockholdings also increased
markedly. By the end of 1993, approximately one out of every five stock
exchange-listed corporations had average employee ownership of about
fifteen percent.26 Originally created by companies for their tax and
antitakeover features, these ESOPs have become increasingly activist
about corporate governance issues.27
Unions started using their position as shareholders to gain greater
input into the corporate decisionmaking process. In the mid-1980s, union
pension funds began building alliances with other pension funds through
shareholder groups.28 These shareholder groups began pushing for
23. McGurn, supra note 16, at 5.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id. at 6. See generally Joseph Raphael Blasi & Douglas Lynn Kruse, The New Owners: The
Mass Emergence of Employee Ownership in Public Companies and What It Means to American
Business (1991) (documenting rapid growth of, and forecasting continued increases in, employee
ownership of public corporations); Elana Ruth Hollo, The Quiet Revolution: Employee Stock
Ownership Plans and Their Influence on Corporate Governance, Labor Unions, and Future
American Policy, 23 Rutgers L.L 561 (1992) (reporting statistics on ESOP stock ownership in
significant number of large American corporations).
27. Hollo, supra note 26, at 588-89.
28. Thus, the pension funds of the Sheet Metal Workers, the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union were founding members
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corporate changes using, among other things, the shareholder proposal
rule.
The first generation of corporate governance shareholder proposals
was largely sponsored by public pension funds such as the California
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS). Commencing in 1987,
these proposals were made to large groups of companies where
shareholders were dissatisfied with the expanding legal constraints on
takeover activity and urged management to redeem Rights Plans (often
called "poison pills") or submit them to shareholder approval.29
Over the next few years, shareholder activists began to attack other
antitakeover defenses with proposals suggesting that companies prohibit
greenmail payments, that companies opt out of state antitakeover
statutes, and that companies be required to let shareholders approve
placements of large blocks of stock with management-friendly parties."
Shareholder activists also began to focus on the voting process by
proposing changes such as confidential voting in corporate elections.31
Thereafter, shareholders began including proposals seeking broader
structural reforms regarding issues such as executive pay, golden
parachutes, staggered boards, board independence, and supermajority
vote requirements. 2
Labor frequently supported the public pension funds' corporate
governance shareholder proposals. The United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America filed proposals jointly with the State
of Wisconsin Investment Board and CalPERS as early as the mid-
1980s. 3 Other union funds gradually became more activist shareholders.
In 1989, the United Mine Workers used shareholder proposals as part of
a multi-tactic corporate campaign."' The Electrical Workers and United
of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII). By 1993, one-quarter of the CII's membership was
union funds. McGurn, supra note 16, at 6.
29. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 16, at 1906. For further discussion of poison pills and
other antitakeover devices, see Thomas & Dixon, supra note 4, ch. 20.
30. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 16, at 1908 n.166.
31. Ted Jaenicke, Shareholder Proposals Gain Higher Votes But Fewer Victories, IRRC Corp.
Governance Bull., May/June 1991, at 1, 1.
32. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 (summarizing voting results on proposals regarding golden parachutes,
classified (staggered) boards, independent directors, nominating committees, director stock holdings,
cumulative voting, supermajority requirements, executive compensation, and limits on director
terms).
33. See McGurn, supra note 16, at 6.
34. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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Paperworkers offered corporate governance shareholder proposals in
1990, and the Textile Workers joined in sponsoring proposals in 1991.31
Labor's involvement with shareholder proposals really took off in the
early 1990s. In 1991, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) issued model proxy voting and
investment guidelines in which it encouraged its members to push more
activist agendas.36 This was followed in 1992 by the Industrial Union
Department (IUD) of the AFL-CIO passing a resolution urging
"'workers and their representatives to take a more active role in the
governance of their corporations and in responsible investing and proxy
voting by pension plans."'37 A similar resolution called for the use of
"'coordinated campaigns in demanding corporate accountability."' 38
The rise in labor shareholder activism was farther encouraged by the
SEC's simplification of the federal proxy solicitation rules in 1992 and
the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL) issuance of proxy voting
guidelines in July 1994.39 The 1992 amendments to the proxy rules did
not directly affect Rule 14a-8, although they were tailored in part to
benefit shareholder proponents." Two new exemptions expressly
protected communications calculated to garner support for Rule 14a-8
proposals: the unqualified carve-out from the definition of "solicitation"
set forth in new Rule 14a-1(1)(2) permitting unilateral announcements by
proponents of why they intend to vote in favor of their own proposals,4'
35. See McGum, supra note 16, at 6.
36. Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in the Use of
Proxy Voting To Influence Corporate Governance, 7 Lab. Law. 771,787 (1991).
37. McGurn, supra note 16, at 6 (quoting resolutions from IUD's Constitutional Convention in
1992).
38. Id. (quoting resolutions from IUD's Constitutional Convention).
39. See Patricia B. Limbacher, DOL Peeking Over Proxy Shoulders, Pensions & Investments,
Mar. 6, 1995, at 1; Patrick S. McGurn, DOL Issues New Guidelines on Proxy Voting, Active
Investing, IRRC Corp. Governance Bull., July/Aug. 1994, at 1.
40. For further discussion of the impact of the 1992 amendments to the proxy rules, see generally
Thomas & Dixon, supra note 4, § 6.02, and Thomas W. Briggs, Shareholder Activism and
Insurgency Under the New Proxy Rules, 50 Bus. Law. 99 (1994).
41. Rule 14a-1(1)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(1)(2) (1997). Under this new rule, in most
circumstances a security holder who does not otherwise engage in a proxy solicitation can state how
it intends to vote and its reasons for its vote, provided that the security holder makes the
communication in a published or broadcast opinion, a speech in a public forum, a press release, a
statement, or an advertisement. Assuming compliance with the prescribed conditions, Rule 14a-8
proponents therefore may avail themselves of this provision for exempt voting announcements to
influence the vote of their fellow shareholders without risking even proxy antifraud liability.
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and the qualified exemption provided by Rule 14a-2(b)(1) for inter-
shareholder solicitations that extends to Rule 14a-8 proponents.4'
The new rules permit shareholders who are not seeking proxy
authority to communicate freely with each other without fear of
triggering the federal filing requirements. Shareholders can discuss
potential proposals amongst themselves to determine whether other
shareholders will support them. Even after a proposal has appeared on
the corporate ballot, Rule 14a-2(b)(1) permits shareholders to discuss it
with other shareholders and ask them to support it without triggering the
proxy rules coverage subject to some limitations, such as not soliciting
proxies from other shareholders.43 This enables shareholders to solicit
support for their proposals from other shareholders without spending
large sums of money to make the SEC filings that are necessary under
the proxy rules.
In its 1994 interpretative bulletin on proxy voting, the DOL advocated
a corporate activist role for private pension funds.' Investors were urged
to monitor or influence corporate management when such activities
would be likely to enhance the value of investments. The DOL suggested
issues to be raised in shareholder proposals, including the independence
and expertise of candidates for boards of directors, executive
compensation, the nature of long-term business plans, and corporate
policies regarding mergers and acquisitions.45
All of these forces came together in the 1994 proxy season, when
labor interests collectively filed more proposals concerning corporate
governance (80) and obtained majority support on more of them (7) than
the combined efforts of all other institutional investors.46 This trend
42. Rule 14a-2(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1). There are several important restrictions
attached to this qualified exemption, including the conditions that the shareholder cannot seek
"directly or indirectly, either on its own or another's behalf, the power to act as proxy for a security
holder," and that the shareholder cannot be a member of any Rule 13D group that has not disclosed it
will not engage in a control transaction. L.
43. let For further discussion of the effect of the new proxy rules on shareholder voting, see
Thomas & Dixon, supra note 4, § 6.02.
44. For the full text of this bulletin, see 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860 (July 29, 1994) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 2509).
45. Interpretive Bull., 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1996).
46. Patrick S. McGurn, LaborAgain Takes Lead Role in Activism, IRRC Corp. Governance Bull.,
Nov.Dec. 1994, at 3, 3 [hereinafter McGurn, Labor Takes Lead]; see also Bernstein, supra note 4, at
79 (reporting that unions accounted for 70 proxy battles and 7 of the 11 victories registered by
shareholders during 1994); Patrick S. McGurn, Controversy Swirls Around Labor Unions'
Shareholder Activism, IRRC Corp. Governance Bull., JanJFeb. 1994, at 1, 3 [hereinafter McGurn,
Controversy Swirls] (discussing proposals filed before actual votes taken).
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seemed to continue in 1995 and 1996. By the end of 1994, labor
organizations had filed for the 1995 proxy season almost as many
proposals as the year before, with more expected as the season
continued.47 A group of fourteen labor groups, including unions, union
pension funds, individual union members, and a labor-oriented
investment fund, filed seventy-five out of the 265 shareholder proposals
on corporate governance issues that were tracked by an independent
shareholder organization.4' These labor-related proponents filed more
shareholder proposals than any other group of investors for the 1995
proxy season.49
This rise in labor's shareholder activism has focused national attention
on labor's use of the shareholder proposal rule. To better understand the
issues surrounding labor's use of the shareholder proposal mechanism,
we next examine Rule 14a-8 and the SEC's current application of the
rule to labor union proposals.
III. THE SEC'S CURRENT APPLICATION OF RULE 14a-8
TO LABOR'S SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
A. The Mechanics ofRule 14a-8
Shareholders of public companies have the ability, subject to certain
limitations and restrictions, to put proposals on the company's ballot at
its annual meeting through the use of Rule 14a-8, the shareholder
proposal rule."0 This rule states that if a security holder of a corporation
notifies the company of its intention to present a proposal for action at a
forthcoming shareholders' meeting, the company is required to include
the proposal in its own proxy material and to provide a means by which
the security holders can vote with respect to the proposal.5 However, the
issuer can exclude a proposal if the proponent fails to meet certain
procedural eligibility requirements" or substantive content restrictions. 3
47. Patrick S. McGurn, Labor, IRAA Spark Active 1995 Shareholder Campaign, IRRC Corp.
Governance Bull., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 1, 1.
48. Id at 1; McGurn, Labor Takes Lead, supra note 46, at 3.
49. McGurn, supra note 47, at 1.
50. See Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997). For a more complete description of the
mechanics of Rule 14a-8, see Thomas & Dixon, supra note 4, ch. 16.
51. Rule 14a-8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a).
52. Rule 14a-8(a) establishes four threshold eligibility requirements for shareholders seeking to
make proposals. These requirements specify: the number of proposals a shareholder can submit; the
minimum number of securities a shareholder must own to make a proposal; the latest date by which
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If the company includes the proposal on the ballot, the proponent is
entitled to print a short supporting statement of the reasons that it
believes shareholders should vote for the proposal. 4 The company may
respond with an opposing statement of unlimited length." The company
has the option of printing the name and address of the proponent and the
number of shares that the proponent holds or a statement that this
information is available from the company upon request. 6
If the company chooses to exclude a proposal,57 management has the
burden of demonstrating to the SEC that its position is justified. If the
SEC issues a "no-action" letter, stating that it will not take any legal
action against the company if it omits the proposal, and the company
omits the proposal, the proponent has a private right of action to force
the issuer to include the proposal in proxy materials.59
B. Applying Rule 14a-8 to Labor's Shareholder Proposals
Some corporations have resisted labor's efforts to use the shareholder
proposal rule by seeking to exclude labor's proposals under various
provisions of subsection (c) of Rule 14a-8. The usual grounds for
exclusion proffered by companies faced with labor-shareholder
a shareholder can submit proposals; and the shareholder's attendance at the meeting to present the
proposal.
53. Rules 14a-8(c)(1)-(13), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1)-(13), set forth 13 circumstances under
which companies may omit proposals from their proxy materials. Management has the burden of
demonstrating the validity of its view that a proposal may properly be omitted. Rule 14a-8(d), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d).
54. Rule 14a-8(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
55. Rule 14a-8(e) states that if the issuer includes a proposal and the issuer plans to also include a
statement in opposition, the issuer must, no later than 30 days prior to the date when the issuer files
preliminary copies of the proxy statement with the SEC, forward to the proponent a copy of the
statement in opposition. If the proponent believes that the statement in opposition is false or
misleading, it must promptly appeal to the SEC in writing and must provide the issuer with a copy of
the appeal. Rule 14a-8(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e).
56. Rule 14a-8(b)(2), 17 C.F.L § 240.14a-8(b)(2).
57. Under Rule 14a-8(d), if management intends to omit a proposal it must submit a letter to the
SEC stating its reasons at least 80 days before it files its preliminary proxy material. Submissions to
the SEC must include copies of the proposal, any supporting statement received from the proponent,
a statement of reasons as to why the issuer deems the omission to be proper, and, if the issuer has
based its reasons for omission upon matters of law, a supporting opinion of counsel. The issuer must
also forward to the proponent a copy of the statement of reasons why the issuer deems the omission
of the proposal to be proper.
58. Thomas & Dixon, supra note 4, § 16.02.
59. Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that
private cause of action exists to enforce Rule 14a-8).
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proposals' are that the proposal either: (1) relates to the redress of a
personal claim or grievance against the company or is designed to further
a personal interest of the proponent that is not shared with the other
security holders at large (the "personal grievance" exclusion);6' or
(2) deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business
operations of the company (the "ordinary business" exclusion).62
The SEC acts as the initial arbiter of these disputes. 3 Through its
interpretation of Rule 14a-8's exemptions, the SEC can slow, or even
stop, labor's use of the shareholder proposal mechanism.'
1. Rule 14a-8(c)(4): The Personal Grievance Exclusion
One exclusion commonly cited by management in its attempts to
exclude labor proposals is Rule 14a-8(c)(4), the "personal grievance"
exclusion.65 Rule 14a-8 was adopted in part to serve as a vehicle for
shareholder communication on matters of common interest to the entire
shareholder body.66 Thus, the SEC has allowed companies to omit
proposals submitted to redress a personal claim or grievance against the
issuer or any other person, or to further a personal interest. This
exclusion was intended to prevent shareholder proposals from being used
to harass issuers into giving the proponent some particular benefit or to
60. Thomas & Dixon, supra note 4, § 16.04.
61. Rule 14a-8(c)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4).
62. Rule 14a-8(c)(7), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7). We should also mention that there are other
grounds on which the company can seek no-action relief from the SEC. In particular, companies
have sometimes been successful using Rule 14a-8(a)(4) as a grounds for excluding a labor
shareholder proposal. See Thomas & Dixon, supra note 4, § 16.04.
63. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (requiring company seeking to exclude shareholder proposal to
file proposal, proponent's supporting statement, and company's statement of reasons supporting
exclusion with SEC); Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice with
Respect to Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 12,599, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,635, at 86,604 (July 7, 1976) (describing SEC staff procedures with
respect to reviewing and commenting on company statements regarding proposal exclusion).
64. Patrick S. McGum, SEC Holds Key to Labor Union Shareholder Proposals, IRRC Corp.
Govemance Bull., JanJFeb. 1994, at 9.
65. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 4.
66. As now-Justice Ginsburg has described shareholders' informational rights: "Access to
management proxy solicitations to sound out management views and to communicate with other
shareholders on matters of major import is a right informational in character, properly derived from
section 14(a)... Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 421 (D.C. Cir.
1992). Congress recognized the need to provide not only for disclosure of matters management
intended to present to a vote, but also for shareholders to be given a "reasonable opportunity to
present their own proposals and views to their fellow security holders." S. Rep. No. 85-700, at 3
(1957).
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accomplish objectives particular to the proponent and not to other
shareholders.67
The basis for this exclusion is an administrative concern that the costs
of vindicating an individual shareholder's interest not be shifted to the
issuer and hence to all other shareholders. 8 In many cases, the
personalized nature of a shareholder-proponent's complaint against an
issuer may be obvious from the content of the proposal or supporting
statement. As currently construed by the SEC, however, the (c)(4)
analysis permits the SEC's staff to look beyond the substance of the
proposal and statement in considering whether a Rule 14a-8 submission
that appears on its face to be relevant to the entire shareholder body
nevertheless relates to a personal claim or grievance of the proponent and
therefore can be omitted.69
67. This exclusion was confined to personal claims or grievances against the issuer or its
management prior to its amendment in 1972. The 1972 amendment extended it to cover personal
claims or grievances against any person. See Adoption of Amendments to Rules 14a-5 and 14a-8
Under the Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release No. 9784, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,997, at 82,149 (Sept. 22, 1972).
In 1983, the Commission amended subsection (c)(3) (now (c)(4)) to add the following clause: "or
if it [the proposal] is designed to result in a benefit to the proponent or to further a personal interest,
which benefit or interest is not shared with the other security holders at large ... " Amendments to
Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders,
Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,417,
at 86,205 (Aug. 16, 1983). Modified from the version initially proposed in 1982 to avoid
disqualification of a shareholder proposal based on the proponent's personal commitment to, or
intellectual or emotional interest in, the subject-matter, this amendment was "intended to clarify the
scope of the exclusionary paragraph and to insure that the security holder proposal process would
not be abused by proponents attempting to achieve personal ends that are not necessarily in the
common interest of the issuer's shareholders generally." Id at 86,205.
68. In codifying this exclusionary ground in 1948, the SEC noted:
[In a few cases security holders have abused this privilege [the right to submit shareholder
proposals] by using the rule to achieve personal ends which are not necessarily in the common
interest of the issuer's security holders generally. In order to prevent such abuse of the rule, but
without unduly restricting the privilege which it grants to security holders, the amendment
places reasonable limitations upon the submission of such proposals.
Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4185, 13 Fed. Reg. 6678, 6679
(Nov. 5, 1948).
69. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, [1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,262, at 85,352 (Oct. 14, 1982). Tracing the evolution of this
interpretive approach, the SEC explained that the staff originally had sought to reduce the
subjectivity of the (c)(4) analysis by interpreting it narrowly to compel issuers to demonstrate a
"direct relationship between the subject matter of a proposal and the proponent's personal claim or
grievance." Id at 83,351. Such a relationship was apparent where the proposal, or its supporting
statement, revealed on its face the existence of a personal grievance. Id at 85,351-52.
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While acknowledging the difficulties inherent in SEC staff
assessments of a proponent's subjective motivations, the SEC has found
this analytical approach preferable to the staffs previous, unsuccessful
efforts to develop a narrower, more objective test based primarily on the
subject matter of a proposal." The SEC has generally limited its use of
(c)(4) analysis to instances where a proposal is one of many tactics used
to redress a grievance against an issuer.71
One common justification advanced by corporations for omitting labor
proposals has been that these proposals would further personal
grievances of the employees or offer benefits to employee shareholders
that are not available to all shareholders. Thus, corporations often argue
to the SEC that labor shareholder proposals are simply another tactic
used by labor to further interests that labor has sought to achieve by
various other means over the years.72
The SEC's present position with regard to labor shareholder proposals
is that employees and shareholders have the same rights to offer
proposals.73 Proposals may not be excluded "based only on the
contention that the proponent is acting in the interests of union
In the release, the staff found the following:
[I]ncreasingly sophisticated proponents and their counsel began to draft proposals in broad
terms so that they might be of general interest to all security holders, rather than in narrow terms
reflecting the personal interests that motivated their submission. A contemporaneous
development was the increased use of the security holder proposal process as a tool to bring
pressure upon issuers to serve some personal interest of the proponent. These developments
limited the efficacy of the staff's efforts to establish an objective test for determining the
applicability of the rule and, consequently, a more subjective analysis has resulted. This more
subjective analysis has been reflected in letters which indicated that a proposal, despite its being
drafted in such a way that it might relate to matters which may be of general interest to all
security holders, properly may be excluded under paragraph (c)(4), if it is clear from the facts
presented by the issuer that the proponent is using the proposal as a tactic designed to redress a
personal grievance or further a personal interest.
Id. at 85,352.
70. See id. at 85,351.
71. Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, 4 Securities Regulation 2020 (1990).
72. See, e.g., Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 11, 1997, at *12, available
in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (alleging that union's proposal was motivated by desire to
foster organizing campaign of its affiliate); Dow Jones & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 10, 1997,
at *12, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (alleging union's proposal was submitted to
pressure management to concede in contract negotiations); Frontier Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
Jan. 23, 1997, at *3, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (same).
73. See Securities: SEC Streamlining Its Handling of No-Action Letters, Quinn Says, Daily Rep.
for Executives (BNA), June 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Drexec File [hereinafter
SEC Streamlining] (reporting remarks of Linda C. Quinn, director of SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance, at 7th Annual General Counsel Conference, June 13, 1995).
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members."74 To exclude a labor shareholder proposal, the company must
present concrete, non-circumstantial evidence that the proposal is merely
another tactic in the union's corporate campaign. The burden is on the
company to show that the proposal qualifies for exclusion.s
The SEC's reaction to company challenges to labor shareholder
proposals has been far from uniform, however, leaving uncertain any
predictions as to which proposals may actually be included in proxy
materials.76 The mere contention that there are disputed issues between
the company and the union proponent is insufficient to warrant exclusion
of a facially neutral proposal. The company must satisfy the added
burden of producing concrete evidence demonstrating that the proposal
was motivated by a labor grievance.77 Although SEC policy dictates that
union shareholder proposals may be excludable if a company provides
documentation that the proposals are part of a union's corporate
campaign," the SEC has responded to this assertion in varying ways.79 In
74. Id. (reporting remarks of Quinn).
75. See id. (reporting remarks of Quinn).
76. See McGurn, supra note 64, at 9; Anand, supra note 17, at 26; Leslie Scism, Labor Unions
Increasingly Initiate Proxy Proposals, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1994, at Cl.
77. See Daniel M. Taitz & Lance J. Gotko, Shareholder Communications, 976 PLI/Corp. 133, 168
(1997) (reporting SEC's intent to require "smoking gun" physical evidence to show abuse of
proposal process); Dow Jones & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 8, 1995, at *2, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File (noting absence of documented evidence from union proponent,
"acknowledging that [its] proposal was intended to enhance the union's bargaining power" as reason
for staff belief that (c)(4) could not be relied upon to exclude proposal).
78. See MeGum, supra note 64, at 10 (quoting William E. Morley, senior associate director of
SEC's Division of Corporation Finance).
79. McGurn, supra note 64, at 9 (comparing opposite SEC responses to similar arguments for
omission presented by Dow Jones and Consolidated Freightways respectively); Anand, supra note
17, at 27 (comparing opposite fates of similar requests for no-action relief made by Motorola and
Southwestern Bell respectively).
In some cases, the SEC's approach seems easily defensible. For example, the SEC refused to
concur that Consolidated Freightways, Inc. could exclude from its proxy materials a labor
shareholder proposal requesting that the board of directors take any necessary steps to remove the
requirement that 80% of the outstanding shares be voted to change the structure of the board.
Consolidated Freightways, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 25, 1995, at *32, available in 1995 WL
28836. The company contended that the union was actively pursuing a corporate campaign designed
to "harass and pressure" the company in connection with the union's efforts to organize at the
company's non-union operating subsidiaries, and in order to achieve other labor-related goals. Id. at
*1.
The proponent countered that there was no possible connection between the elimination of a
super-majority requirement and the advancement of the union's interests in organizing or collective
bargaining. The proponent emphasized that, by insisting that the employee-shareholders did not truly
care about corporate governance issues, the company was refusing to acknowledge that the
proponents had a stake in the financial future of the company equal to that of other shareholders. Id.
at *21.
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recent no-action letters, the SEC has tended to permit labor shareholder
proposals that relate to facially-neutral corporate governance issues.8"
The SEC concluded that the company had not met its burden of establishing that the proposal was
submitted by the union to redress a personal claim or grievance. The proposal was thus not
excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(4). Id. at *32.
In another situation, Merck & Co. was permitted to omit from its proxy materials a shareholder
proposal that the company implement a policy of using construction companies whose work force is
unionized. Merck & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 7, 1994, at *7, available in 1994 WL
33556. The company argued that the proposal was designed to further the union's personal interest
and was thus excludable under Rule 14a-S(c)(4). Id. at *4. Specifically, the company argued that the
proposal was "designed to result in the hiring of members of the Proponent union and its
affiliates ... to the exclusion of non-union members," and that this benefit would not be shared with
the company's other security holders. Id. at *5. In addition, the company contended that the union
had used a variety of other tactics in the past to achieve the goal set out in the proposal. Id.
The SEC concurred in the company's view that the proposal dealt with a personal interest of the
labor union proponent that was not shared with the securities holders at large and thus could be
omitted under the personal grievance exception. Id. at *7; see also Staff Rules on Shareholder
Proposals on Labor Unions, Communications, Pay, 26 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 240 (Feb. 18,
1994); Dow Jones & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library,
Noact File (allowing omission of proposal submitted by shareholder union officials).
80. For instance, in two 1995 no-action requests the SEC did not issue a no-action letter to
companies seeking to exclude these types of proposals. In the first instance, the SEC rejected
Caterpillar, Inc.'s claim that it should be able to exclude two corporate governance shareholder
proposals made by a labor pension fund. Caterpillar, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 13, 1995, at
*14, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File. The company asserted that the proposals were
excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(4). Id. at *3. The company noted that a union related to the
proponent had been on strike at several U.S. company facilities and that the union had used company
stockholder meetings to air labor grievances in the past. Id. at *5.
The proponent, however, argued that there was absolutely no connection between the submission
of the shareholder proposals and the other matters at issue between the company and the union. Id at
*2. The SEC refused to allow the company to rely on Rule 14a-8(c)(4) as a basis for omitting the
proposals, noting that the company had not met its burden of establishing that the proposals were
submitted by the union to redress a personal claim or grievance. Id at *14; see also Staff Refuses To
Concur in Omission of Shareholder Proposals on Directors, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 197
(Jan. 27, 1995).
Similarly, the SEC refused to concur that Avondale Industries could exclude from its proxy
materials shareholder proposals requesting that the board of directors be declassified, that a
compensation committee be created, that confidential voting be implemented, that the company
redeem its Rights Plan, and that shareholders be granted greater control over changes in the
company's bylaws. Avondale Indus., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 28, 1995, at *3, available in
LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Noact File. The company argued that the proposals were not intended to
advance the interests of the company's shareholders but rather to advance the union's efforts to
unionize the company. Id. at *57. The company further contended that the union proponents were in
fact "using the shareholder proposal process as a tool to bring pressure on the Company in
connection with the Union's organization efforts." Id. at *59.
The union countered that the proposals were designed to provide a general benefit to all
shareholders in that they related to "empowering shareholders and holding management more
accountable to the owners." Id. at *20. The union further argued that the exercise of the employees'
rights of association under the National Labor Relations Act should not lead to the forfeiture of their
ownership rights under the securities laws, and that employee-owners have the same rights as non-
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2. Rule 14a-8(c)(7): The Ordinary Business Exclusion
The second reason frequently proffered by corporations in support of
the omission of labor shareholder proposals has been that the proposals
relate to the ordinary business of the company. 1 The (c)(7) "ordinary
business" exclusion had its genesis in state corporation law statutes that
allocate to the board of directors and corporate management exclusive
power with respect to day-to-day affairs of the business. Matters that fall
within this category can be excluded by a company from its shareholder
ballot.82 The rationale for the exclusion is that management's exercise of
its specialized talents should be protected from investors attempting to
dictate the minutiae of daily business decisions.
Challenges to social and public policy proposals usually assert that the
proposals may be omitted because they deal with matters relating to the
conduct of the company's ordinary business operations. Under the
previous interpretation of (c)(7), shareholder proposals involving
substantial policy considerations could not be omitted from proxy
materials pursuant to the ordinary business exception. In a letter to
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., the SEC reversed its previous
interpretation, advising that the company could omit a proposal
addressing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as relating to
its ordinary business, even though the proposal raised social policy
employee owners. Id at *20-21. Finally, the union pointed out that the company's claim
that the "true intention" of the union proponents was "to harass management as opposed to
protect[ing]... the economic interests" of the company's shareholders lacked factual support. Id. at
*21-22.
The SEC found that the company had not met its burden of demonstrating that the proposals were
submitted with the intent of redressing a personal claim or grievance of the union proponents and
refused to conclude that the proposals were designed to result in a benefit to the union proponents
uniquely. The proposals were thus not excludable under the personal grievance exception. Id. at *3.
The SEC recently proposed to alter the approach it takes in applying the personal grievance
exception. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39,093,
Sept. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 578696. Under the proposed approach, if the proposal
(including its supporting statement) is "neutral on its face," the Division will "automatically express
'no view,' rather than concur or decline to concur in [the proposal's] exclusion." Id. at *8. Thus, the
Division would no longer seek to determine the motivation of the shareholder proponent in
submitting a proposal neutral on its face. A company receiving a response of "no view" would be
able to omit the proposal from its proxy materials if it believes it has sufficient evidence to support
its contention that the neutral proposal reflects a personal grievance or special interest. This change
in the administration of 14a-8(c)(4) would not affect a proposal that relates to a personal grievance or
special interest on its face (i.e., is not neutral). Id.
81. Rule 14a-8(c)(7), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1997).
82. See Thomas & Dixon, supra note 4, § 16.04[G].
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concerns. 83 The proponent of the proposal challenged this change in
federal district court and won, only to be reversed on appeal by the
Second Circuit. '4
In light of this recent decision, the SEC recommenced issuing no-
action advice85 to companies, stating that shareholder proposals that
relate to the corporation's ordinary business, but that also raise
substantial social policy considerations, can be omitted from proxy
materials pursuant to the ordinary business exception.86 Thus, it appears
that employment-related shareholder proposals may be omitted from
proxy statements if the proposals deal with ordinary business issues,
even when these proposals raise important social policy issues.87
The ordinary business exemption has also been used to exclude some
labor shareholder proposals. For example, in 1990, Humana, Inc. was
permitted to exclude from its proxy materials a shareholder proposal
that would have required the company's board of directors to recognize a
specific union and to bargain collectively with that union because
the proposal related to the conduct of ordinary business operations.88
The company argued that the proposal could be excluded under
Rule 14a-8(c)(7) since it dealt with a matter relating to the conduct of the
company's ordinary business.89 The SEC found that questions involving
a company's relations with its employees-including collective
bargaining agreements on conditions of employment-were matters
relating to the conduct of ordinary business operations. The proposal was
thus excludable under the ordinary business exception.9"
83. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Oct. 13, 1992, at *18,
available in 1992 WL 289095.
84. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd
inpart, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
85. Due to an injunction, the SEC had suspended issuing any advice with regard to the ordinary
business exclusion pending the outcome of this lawsuit. See, e.g., Ken Bertsch, Court Reverses
Cracker Barrel Decision; Equal Employment Resolutions in Doubt, IRRC News for Investors, Jan.
1995, at 1, 1.
86. See SEC Streamlining, supra note 73 (reporting remarks of Linda C. Quinn, director of SEC's
Division of Corporation Finance, at 7th Annual General Counsel Conference, June 13, 1995).
87. See Bertsch, supra note 85, at 1.
88. Humana, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Oct. 17, 1990, at *7, available in 1990 WL 286980; see
also Company May Omit Proposal that Would Require It To Recognize Specific Union, 22 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1561 (Nov. 2, 1990).
89. Humana, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, at *1, available in 1990 WL 286980.
90. Id. at *7.
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IV. EVALUATING MANAGEMENT'S PROPOSALS TO BLOCK
LABOR'S USE OF THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE
Many of labor's shareholder proposals are of the traditional corporate
governance variety, raising issues such as the implementation of
confidential shareholder voting, redemption of poison pills, golden
parachutes, staggered boards, and increased numbers of independent
directors on boards or key committees of the board. In this respect, labor
and other shareholders share a common interest: creating a more
responsive corporate governance system that will take shareholders'
interests into account in decisionmaking.
However, there may be an inherent conflict between the investment
goals of labor shareholders and those of other shareholders.9' In addition
to maximizing the return on its investments, labor is also interested in
such long-term goals as job security, wage growth, and ensuring the
adequacy and security of workers' retirement income.9" Thus, labor
activists may not believe that financial returns on their stock portfolios
are their only reason for submitting corporate governance proposals.93
Furthermore, labor unions have been accused of using the shareholder
proposal mechanism as part of a "corporate campaign" to advance their
interests as worker representatives in some companies. In the next
section, we look at some of these claims.
A. Corporate Campaigns
Corporate campaigns are "multi-tactic pressure campaign[s] directed
at a company (or companies) by a union engaged in collective
bargaining, wage disputes or protesting workplace grievances."94
Shareholder proposals are one of several tactics that the union deploys to
pressure management to make concessions in its negotiations with the
union. For example, in 1989 the United Mine Workers used shareholder
proposals (although not Rule 14a-8) as part of a corporate campaign
91. In another paper, one of the authors examines this question more closely. See Schwab &
Thomas, supra note 4.
92. See Michael A. Calabrese, What Labor Wants: A Union Perspective on Pension Fund
ShareholderActivism, Corp. Governance Advisor, Jan/Feb. 1994, at 24,25.
93. Id. at26.
94. Patrick S. McGurn, Labor Steps Up Use of 'Corporate Campaigns,' IRRC Corp. Governance
Bull., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 7, 7.
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against the Pittston Company.95 In that contest, the union solicited
proxies as part of its effort to gain shareholder approval of its
proposals.96
The unions' increased use of the shareholder proposal rule as a
mechanism for bringing about corporate governance and other changes
has led corporate management to accuse the unions of abusing the proxy
voting process.97 For example, the members of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters offered several shareholder proposals for the
annual meeting at Consolidated Freightways in 1994 at a time when the
Teamsters were engaged in national negotiations for a new labor contract
with Consolidated Freightways. 9' The company promptly labeled these
proposals as part of a "campaign of harassment," that has "everything to
do with labor relations and nothing to do with corporate governance." 99
Congress became involved in the debate over labor's use of the
shareholder proposal rule. On October 31, 1995, the House Committee
on Economic and Educational Opportunities, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation, began a review of the increased use of
corporate campaigns by unions." ° Congressman Hoekstra (R-MI), the
Subcommittee Chair, was disturbed by reports of pressure tactics being
used by unions in corporate campaigns."' He quoted from an
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers organizing manual,
which said that the union's strategy was to apply economic pressure to
get the employer to sign an agreement or to scale back its business, leave
the union's jurisdiction, or go out of business."0 2 In addition, Congress
has been urged to examine whether the National Labor Relations Act
should be amended to make it an unfair labor practice for a union to
95. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pittston Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC) 94,946 (D.D.C.
Nov. 24, 1989).
96. Id. at 95,267.
97. MeGurn, Controversy Swirls, supra note 46, at 1.
98. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., Proxy Statement, Mar. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Edgarp File, Filing 94516840.
99. Scism, supra note 76, at Cl (quoting James Allen, Vice President of Consolidated
Freightways).
I00. William Goodling, Subcommittee Begins Review of Corporate Campaigns and Salting,
Cong. Press Release, Oct. 27, 1995.
101. Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister, Organizing: Union 'Salts' Being Used To Apply Economic
Pressure, House Panel Told, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Nov. 1, 1995, available in Westlaw, BNA-
DLR Database.
102. Id. Congressman Hoekstra said, "I find the idea of hiding behind either the First Amendment
or the National Labor Relations Act in order to put a company out of business patently offensive. It
may be legal, but that certainly doesn't make it right." Id.
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engage in certain corporate campaign tactics.0 3 Corporate pressure for
changes may lead to congressional action on this question.
B. The ATA 's Rulemaking Petition
As part of this movement to restrict labor's access to company proxy
statements through Rule 14a-8, the American Trucking Association
(ATA) petitioned the SEC to change its interpretation of Rule 14a-8 to
allow corporations to exclude shareholder proposals by labor
representatives at companies that are involved in collective bargaining
negotiations or union organizing campaigns." The ATA claimed that the
SEC's current interpretation of Rule 14a-8 allows unions to use
shareholder proposals to pressure the management of companies that are
engaged in contemporaneous collective bargaining negotiations and
union organizing campaigns." 5 More specifically, the ATA (and other
business groups) believes that labor is using the shareholder proposal
device to "'achieve personal ends which are not necessarily in the
common interest of the issuer's security holders generally.""1
0 6
The ATA's proposals, if implemented by the SEC or Congress, would
sharply curtail labor's use of the shareholder proposal rule. 7 Several
objectors to the ATA proposals have pointed out that: (1) these proposals
are beneficial to shareholders, and even if the proposals were unpopular,
they would not receive sufficient votes to be considered again and hence
reform is unnecessary;0 8 (2) there are few documented proposals that are
103. Id.
104. ATA Letter, supra note 9.
105. Id. at 2 (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 4185 (Nov. 5, 1948) (interpreting Rule 14a-8's
exclusion of "personal grievances")).
106. Id. (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 4185 (interpreting Rule 14a-8's exclusion of
"personal grievances")).
107. Letter from Robert Lenhard, Michael Zucker, & Ed Durkin, American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, to Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, & Steven M.N.
Wallman, SEC Commissioner 6-9 (Oct. 26, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter AFSCME
Letter].
At least one union has claimed that the ATA proposals would curtail the union's ability to engage
in active monitoring of corporate management as required by the DOL. Letter from Frank Hanley,
General President, International Union of Operating Engineers, to Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, &
Steven M.N. Wallman, SEC Commissioner (Nov. 8, 1995) (on file with author).
108. AFSCME Letter, supra note 107, at 3; Letter from William Patterson & Bartlett Naylor,
Office of Corporate Affairs, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, to Arthur Levitt,
SEC Chairman, & Steven M.N. Wallman, SEC Commissioner, 7-9 (Nov. 16, 1995) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Teamsters Letter].
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cited by ATA as abuses of the system; t.9 (3) the ATA's proposals are
overbroad and would bar labor from offering shareholder proposals at
some companies indefinitely;... (4) the proposed system is unworkable
because the SEC would need to make factual determinations that it is ill-
equipped to decide;'.. and (5) all shareholders who submit proposals
have interests that differ from those of other shareholders." 2 Some
objectors also raised constitutional questions about the legitimacy of the
ATA proposals." 3
In the next section, we attempt to determine whether the SEC should
amend Rule 14a-8 as suggested. In particular, we ask whether the ATA's
concerns are shared by the non-union shareholders of the companies
where these proposals are being submitted.
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
One of the main purposes of Rule 14a-8 is to facilitate shareholder
communication between shareholders themselves as well as between
shareholders and corporate management.! 4 The rule essentially taxes all
shareholders for the costs of shareholder proposals by having the
corporation pay for these communications. However, the basis for the
"personal grievance" exclusion, and indirectly for the ATA's proposed
rule changes, is that this tax should not be imposed on shareholders if the
matter being placed before the electorate is not one of interest to
shareholders generally, but rather is personal to a particular shareholder.
One clear measure of whether the company's shareholder body is
interested in a proposal is shareholders' support for the proposal at the
ballot box. If shareholders perceive that labor's proposals are directed
109. AFSCME Letter, supra note 107, at 5; Letter from Morton Bahr, President, Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, to Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, & Steven M.N. Wallman,
SEC Commissioner 3-6 (Nov. 21, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Communications Workers
Letter].
110. AFSCME Letter, supra note 107, at 7; Communications Workers Letter, supra note 109, at
6-9; Letter from Donald S. Miller, Executive Director, Teachers' Retirement Board, City of New
York, to Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, & Steven M.N. Wallman, SEC Commissioner 1 (Nov. 21,
1995) (on file with author); Teamsters Letter, supra note 108, at 10-12.
111. AFSCME Letter, supra note 107, at 8-10.
112. Letter from Sarah A.B. Teslik, Executive Director, Council of Institutional Investors, to
Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman 2 (Nov. 14, 1995) (on file with author).
113. Communication Workers Letter, supra note 109, at 10-11.
114. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Companies thus bear the burden of demonstrating
that an otherwise acceptable proposal should be kept offthe ballot because it falls within one of Rule
14a-8's substantive exclusions.
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not at furthering shareholder interests, but rather at labor's unique
interests, we would anticipate that shareholders would vote against these
labor proposals. Conversely, if shareholders vote for labor proposals in a
manner similar to the way they vote for other proposals, we would
conclude that shareholders view the labor proposals as no different from
other shareholders' prospects.
A. Data and Descfiptive Analysis
We investigated shareholder proposals during the 1994 proxy
season."' The data are drawn from the Voting Results published by the
Corporate Governance Service of the Investor Responsibility Research
Center (IRRC) and from various issues of the Corporate Governance
Bulletin also published by the IRRC.1 6 Table 11" shows the distribution
of corporate governance proposals categorized by the type of proposal
and by whether the proposal was voted on, withdrawn by the submitting
shareholder, omitted by the SEC, or in which the proposal's outcome
was missing and could not be determined. We followed Karpoff,
Malatesta, and Walkling in categorizing these proposals into four groups:
(1) internal corporate governance issues, with subcategories for board
composition and voting issues; (2) external corporate governance issues;
(3) compensation-related issues; and (4) miscellaneous issues." 8
We began with a total of 309 proposals that were included in the
database. The greatest number of proposals were concentrated in the
board composition subcategory of internal corporate governance issues
(97, 31% of the 309 total proposals)," 9 followed closely by
115. We chose 1994 as our sample year because the ATA Letter focused on current labor
proposals. The 1992 proxy rule amendments are widely viewed as having facilitated shareholder
communication and collective action on shareholder proposals. We wanted to use data from the
period after the institution of these changes so that we could examine the issues raised by the ATA
under the current regulatory regime. The 1994 proxy season was long enough after the proxy rule
changes to insure that shareholder proponents were aware of them.
116. Checklist of 1994 Shareholder Proposals, IRRC Corp. Governance Bull., July/Aug. 1994, at
17, 17-3 1; Checklist of 1994 Shareholder Proposals, IRRC Corp. Governance Bull., Jan./Feb. 1994,
at 22, 22-32.
117. See infra p. 74.
118. These categorizations are the same as those used by Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Corporate
Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. Fin. Econ. 365 (1996).
119. The five most popular board composition issues are repealing a classified board (37),
imposing board inclusiveness (15), implementing an independent nominating committee (11),
implementing an independent compensation committee (7), and limiting director tenure (6).
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compensation-related issues (89, 29%).12 ° Voting issues account for 65
proposals (21%),121 followed by miscellaneous issues with 47 (15%),122
and external corporate governance issues with 11 (4 %)."
Voting results are available for only 192 of the 309 proposals. The
remaining proposals were either withdrawn by the shareholder (29),
omitted by the company with SEC approval (27), or we are missing data
on the outcome of the vote (61). For those proposals for which we have
voting data, the largest number, 62 (32%), deal with board composition
issues. Voting issues and compensation-related issues are tied for second
with 52 (27%) each, followed by miscellaneous issues with 19 (10%),
and external corporate governance issues with 7 (4%).
Table 2124 reports the proposals on the proxy ballot by type and
sponsor for the 248 proposals known. Sponsors labeled "Public
Institutions" include five different pension funds: CalPERS, NYCERS,
New York City Fire, New York City Police, and New York City
Teachers pension funds. "Private Institutions" include three different
private organizations: the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility
(ICCR), US Trust, and Wild West Investors. The LongView Fund is a
union-oriented equity index fund. Therefore, we have classified it as a
labor sponsor to reflect its identification with labor groups.
A total of thirteen different labor unions are represented in the sample:
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU-now
UNITE: Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees);
Communication Workers of America (CWA); Electrical Workers;
Independent Association of Publishers' Employees (IAPE); Laborers;
Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union (OCAW);
Operating Engineers; Service Employees; Sheet Metal Workers;
Teamsters; United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW); United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America (UBCJA); and United Food and Commercial
Workers (UFCW). In addition, as noted above, we classified the
LongView Fund as a labor group. These unions submitted a total of
120. The two most popular compensation-related issues are capping executive pay (43) and
disclosing executive compensation (15).
121. The two most popular voting issues involve cumulative voting (34) and confidential voting
(24).
122. The most frequently occurring items involving miscellaneous issues are rotating the annual
meeting location (4), disclosing political contributions (4), imposing political nonpartisanship (4),
and changing the annual meeting date (3).
123. External corporate governance issues exclusively involve voting on poison pill provisions.
124. See infra p. 75.
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forty-one proposals, thirty-two of which eventually appeared on proxy
ballots. We do not have information on whether other sponsor groups,
such as individual investors, are also acting on behalf of labor interests in
submitting proposals, although we note that the IRRC does classify some
proposals by individuals as labor union proposals."2
Individual investors were the most frequent contributors to the sample
of shareholder proposals with 67% of the total proposals in Table 2.
Nearly 80% of the proposals submitted by individuals ultimately led to a
shareholder vote.
Although not shown in a table, the most frequently cited reason why
the SEC issued a no-action letter, allowing an issuer to omit a
shareholder proposal without fear of an ensuing SEC enforcement action
during the 1994 proxy season, was that the proposal dealt with the
company's ordinary business operations. 2 6 These omitted proposals raise
a host of different issues, including club memberships for senior
executives, dividend reinvestment plans, and the rotation of the
company's auditors. The second most often cited reason for a no-action
letter, and the only one that includes union proposals in our sample, is
that the proposal relates to a personal claim or redress of a personal
grievance.'27 A total of eleven proposals were omitted based on the
ordinary business operations exclusion, while six proposals were omitted
because they were found to be related to a personal claim or redress of a
personal grievance.
B. Results of the Analysis
In Table 3,"28 we present descriptive statistics on the fraction of votes
cast that were in favor of a shareholder proposal. We call this variable
FOR. Panel A reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of FOR,
as well as the number of proposals by type of proposal and by sponsor
category. For all proposals, the mean FOR was 21.5% and the median
FOR was 18.4%. Labor unions and public institutions garnered the
highest average FOR votes, 32.7% and 30.9%, respectively. Proposals
sponsored by private institutions received, on average, FOR votes of
125. To the best of our knowledge, the shareholders placed in the individual category are
unaffiliated and not acting on behalf of labor groups. However, it is possible that some of these
proposals should be treated as labor proposals and grouped with the labor union proposals. See infra
Part V.C.
126. See Rule 14a-8(c)(7), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1997).
127. See Rule 14a-8(c)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4).
128. See infra p. 76.
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12.3%, while proposals sponsored by individuals received, on average,
18.2%.
Proposals in the external corporate governance category received the
highest average FOR votes, 53.7%. Internal corporate governance
proposals received an average of 25.9%, while the average for
compensation-related proposals was 12.8%. Miscellaneous proposals
received the lowest levels of support with only 7.3% of those voting
casting their votes in favor of these proposals.
Recall that we are trying to determine if shareholders treat proposals
by labor unions differently from proposals by other sponsors. In Panels B
and C of Table 3, we report t-statistics for differences in the mean
number of votes received and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for differences in the
medians for various pairwise comparisons based on sponsor category and
type of proposal. These tests measure whether the differences between
the means and the medians of the votes cast in favor of proposals are
significantly different between proposals sponsored by different groups.
Panel B shows that labor-sponsored proposals garner a statistically
significant greater fraction of votes in their favor than proposals by all
other sponsors. If we break out this category in more detail, however,
and compare labor-sponsored proposals with each of the other categories
of sponsors, then the largest differences in vote outcome occur between
labor, private institution, and individual-sponsored proposals. If we focus
on the differences between labor-sponsored proposals and proposals
sponsored by the other two groups, we find that there is a statistically
significant difference between the means and the medians. Interestingly,
no significant difference exists between labor-sponsored and public-
institution-sponsored proposals.
Panel C shows that there are significant differences in mean voting
outcomes between different types of proposals. Although only seven
external corporate governance proposals occur in our sample, they attract
significantly more votes than any other type of proposal in the pairwise
comparisons. Internal governance proposals obtained significantly more
favorable votes than did compensation and miscellaneous proposals, and
compensation proposals received significantly more favorable votes than
do miscellaneous proposals.
Table 4129 presents data on a subset of labor proposals that were
identified by the ATA as examples of proposals that would have been
barred from the corporate ballot under their proposal (the "ATA
129. See infra p. 78.
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subsample"). 3° The average favorable vote for these proposals was 28%.
We conducted a pairwise comparison of this average with each of the
other categories. The t-statistics for these differences are all insignificant
at the ten percent level of confidence. The values are reported in the
accompanying note." We note that the average votes in favor of the
ATA subsample were lower, albeit insignificantly, than the average for
all other labor internal governance proposals.
The analysis of Tables 3 and 4 indicates that significant differences
occur between some sponsor categories and proposal types. To assess
whether shareholders treat labor-sponsored proposals differently from
proposals by other sponsors, we REGRESSED the proportion of
favorable votes, FOR, on various independent variables, which include
dummy variables for sponsor category and proposal type, institutional
fractional ownership, and insider fractional ownership. The ownership
variables are included since other researchers have found that ownership
variables help explain how shareholders vote on proposals. 32 Since FOR
is bounded by zero and 100, we unbounded it by the following
transformation: log[FOR/(l-FOR)] 33
130. See ATA Letter, supra note 9, at 3 n.3. The results for the 1995 proposals included in
Table4 are not strictly comparable to the 1994 results reported in the remainder of the paper.
However, because the ATA only identified a small number of "conflict of interest" proposals, we
include them in the table in order to calculate some measures of statistical significance.
In addition to the proposals shown in Table 4, the ATA identified an executive compensation
proposal at Dow Jones & Co. All of the other proposals were "Internal Corporate Governance"
proposals. In order to make meaningful statistical comparisons, we focused on comparisons between
different sponsors' proposals within the "Internal Corporate Governance" category.
The Dow Jones & Co. proposal at issue received 2% of the favorable votes. The average for all
executive compensation proposals was 12.8%. See Table 3, infra p. 76.
131. The values of the t-statistics are as follows:
(1) ATA subsample vs. all other internal corporate governance proposals: 0.39;
(2) ATA subsample vs. all other labor internal corporate governance proposals: -0.75;
(3) ATA subsample vs. public institutions, internal corporate governance proposals: 0.39;
(4) ATA subsample vs. private institutions, internal corporate governance proposals: 1.74
(significant at the 20% level of confidence); and
(5) ATA subsample vs. individuals, internal corporate governance proposals: 0.71.
132. In particular, see James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Voting: Evidence from Charter
Amendment Proposals, 1 J. Corp. Fin. 5, 21-22 tbl. 3 (1994) (finding positive relationship between
insider ownership and votes cast for management antitakeover proposals); James A. Brickley et al.,
Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 267, 272 tbl. 1
(1988) (finding significant relationship between institutional shareholder ownership and votes cast
against management proposals).
133. See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lelm, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155, 1163 (1985) (providing similar treatment of this variable).
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The dummy variables used in Table 5 34 are as follows:
LABOR
PUBLICINST
PRIVATEINST
INTERNALGOV
EXTERNALGOV
MISCELLANEOUS
INSTOWN
INSIDEOWN
= 1 if labor-sponsored proposal, 0 otherwise,
= 1 if public institution-sponsored proposal,
0 otherwise;
= 1 if private institution-sponsored proposal,
0 otherwise;
= 1 if proposal concerns internal corporate
governance, 0 otherwise;
= 1 if proposal concerns external corporate
governance, 0 otherwise;
= 1 if proposal does not concern internal or
external corporate governance or compensation-
related issues, 0 otherwise;
= fractional ownership by institutions as
reported by Spectrum on Compact Disclosure;
= fractional ownership by insiders as reported
by Spectrum on Compact Disclosure as of the
proxy statement date.
Since we do not have complete ownership data for all firms in our
sample, we estimated regressions one and two in Table 5 using the full
sample of 192 proposals and excluded the ownership variables." 5 In
regressions three and four, we include the ownership variables in the
regressions using a sample of 181 firms for which we have complete
data.
In regressions one and three, we included only the dummy variable
LABOR among the sponsor-related variables. LABOR is positive and
134. See infra p. 7 9.
135. We considered including an additional variable for stock ownership by the proponent of each
proposal. This variable would eliminate any possibility that our results would be biased in favor of
proposals made by larger shareholders that hold a greater number of shares than smaller holders. We
cannot determine in many cases how many shares were held by the shareholder proponent because
companies frequently do not disclose this information.
However, we do not believe that these values would be large enough to seriously bias our results.
In the cases where we determined (by looking at SEC no-action letter enclosures) the number of
shares held by the proponents, their percentage ownership levels were below one percent of the
company's stock.
Finally, it bears repeating that we are seeking to determine all shareholders' interest in a proposal.
The fact that a proponent has made a proposal in which it is interested in the outcome does not mean
it no longer has an interest as a shareholder. It certainly continues to be taxed by the company to pay
for its pro rata share of the costs associated with the proposal.
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statistically significant at the .01 level in regression one, while it is
significant at the .05 level in regression three. Thus, after controlling for
the type of proposal and, in regression three, institutional and insider
ownership, labor-sponsored proposals received a greater fraction of votes
for a proposal when compared to all other sponsors as a group.
However, in regressions two and four, we included LABOR,
PUBLICINST, and PRIVATEINST as independent variables. In
regression two, LABOR is significant at the .01 level, and in regression
four, it is significant at the .05 level. Unlike regressions one and three,
the comparison is against the FOR votes garnered by proposals
sponsored by individuals.
PUBLICINST is significantly positive at the .05 level in regressions
two and four. Thus, public institution-sponsored proposals garnered
more FOR votes than did individual-sponsored proposals. Proposals by
private institutions, however, received FOR votes that are significantly
different from those received by proposals made by individuals in
regression two, but not in regression four. Interestingly, the coefficient
on PUBLICINST is slightly lower than that on LABOR. Thus, as in
panel B of Table 3, proposals by public institutions received an
insignificant difference in the percentage of votes cast in their favor than
did labor-sponsored proposals.
In all four regressions, INTERNALGOV and EXTERNALGOV are
positive and statistically significant at the .01 level, while
MISCELLANEOUS is negative and statistically significant at the .01
level. These results indicate that both internal and external corporate
governance proposals received significantly greater votes for the
proposals than did compensation-related proposals, while miscellaneous
proposals received significantly lower votes for the proposal.
Our results in regressions three and four indicate that institutional
ownership had no significant relationship to the votes cast for a proposal.
However, higher ownership by insiders resulted in a significantly lower
vote in favor of a shareholder-sponsored proposal.
As reported in Table 5, proposals sponsored both by labor unions and
public institutions resulted in a higher percentage of votes cast in favor of
the proposal than those sponsored by individuals after controlling for
type of proposal and ownership structure. This is consistent with the
claim that shareholders do not view labor-sponsored proposals as merely
harassment tactics by unions. Indeed, our results suggest that union
proposals are treated by shareholders very much like those of public
institutions, a group that does not have the same potential conflict of
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interest. Therefore, our results do not support the claim that proposals
submitted by labor unions represent a conflict of interest between one
special group of shareholders, that is, labor interests, and the rest of the
shareholders.
C. Caveats
Before discussing our conclusions, we want to note several limitations
on this study. First, ideally we would like to have been able to analyze
separately all of the shareholder proposals in which labor is acting to
further nonshareholder interests and then compare these results with
those for all other shareholder proposals. If we used the ATA's proposed
rule as a means of determining which proposals to exclude, we would
still have needed to identify all labor proposals at companies that were
involved in collective bargaining negotiations or union organizing
campaigns. We requested this information from the ATA (and several of
the opponents to the proposal) but were turned down. Instead, we have
examined a subsample of cases that were identified by the ATA in its
proposal as clear instances of labor abuses of the shareholder proposal
rule.
Second, we have tried to identify all labor proposals. This is easiest
when the proposal is being submitted by a labor union. However, there
may be situations when a proposal is being submitted by a different
sponsor that is acting on behalf of labor. We have tried to identify those
individuals who are submitting proposals on behalf of labor interests. For
all individually-sponsored proposals in our sample, we searched for no-
action letter filings in electronic databases. We checked those filings that
we found to determine if the issuer raised the objection that the proposal
was being made by the individual on labor's behalf. We found no
instances where this was the case. Further, we asked individual
shareholder representatives, and representatives of the AFL-CIO, all of
whom are actively involved in making shareholder proposals, to identify
any individual proposals in our sample that were being made on behalf of
labor. Despite these precautions, we cannot be sure that we have
succeeded in uncovering all instances where an individual was
submitting a shareholder proposal on behalf of labor.
VI. CONCLUSION
We examined a data set containing 192 shareholder proposals
submitted by labor unions, public institutions, private institutions, and
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individuals covering internal and external corporate governance,
compensation-related, and miscellaneous issues. We found that labor
union proposals received more votes than did proposals from private
institutions and individuals, even after controlling for the type of
proposal and ownership structure. These higher vote totals for labor
proposals were comparable to those received by public institutions.
We interpret these results to suggest that any conflicts of interest that
may arise between labor unions and other shareholders may not be as
great as feared. Proposals by labor unions are not treated harshly by
shareholders in general. Rather, they appear to be viewed by
shareholders as no different from proposals by other sponsors.
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Table 1
Distribution of Shareholder Proposals by Type of Proposal
During 1994 Proxy Season
Source of data: IRRC
Proposal Withdrawn Omitted Missing
Type of proposal Voted On by Sponsor by SEC Outcome Total
Internal Corporate
Governance
Board composition 62 9 3 23 97
Voting 52 4 0 9 65
Total: 114 13 3 32 162
External Corporate
Governance 7 1 0 3 11
Compensation-related 52 13 11 13 89
Miscellaneous 19 2 13 13 47
TOTAL 192 29 27 61 309
Proposal Voted On: The proposal went to a shareholder vote. The voting
results are recorded.
Withdrawn by Shareholder: The proposal was withdrawn or not presented by
the shareholder.
Omitted by SEC: The SEC disallowed the proposal for one of 13 reasons.
Missing Outcome: The proposal's voting results were not reported by the
IRRC for unknown reasons.
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Table 2
Corporate Governance Proposals During 1994 Proxy Season by Sponsor
The numbers in each cell are:
Number of proposals voted on / Number of proposals withdrawn by
shareholder or omitted by SEC.
Proposals with unknown outcomes are not included in this table.
Source of data: IRRC
Public Private Labor Individual
Type of proposal Institution Institution Union Investor Total
Internal Corporate
Governance
Board composition 12/3 6/5 8/1 36/3 62/12
Voting 6/2 0/0 8/2 38/0 52/4
Total: 18/5 6/5 16/3 74/3 114/16
External Corporate
Governance 0/0 0/0 7/1 0/0 7/1
Compensation-related 0/0 4/0 6/4 2/20 52/24
Miscellaneous 0/1 0/1 3/1 16/12 9/15
TOTAL 18/6 10/6 32/9 132/35 92/56
The sponsor category Public Institution includes 5 different pension funds:
CalPERS, NYCERS, New York City Fire, New York City Police, and New York
City Teachers.
The sponsor category Private Institution includes 3 different organizations:
ICCR, US Trust, and Wild West Investors.
The sponsor category Labor Union includes 13 different unions: ACTWU,
CWA, Electrical Workers, IAPE, Laborers, OCAW, Operating Engineers, Service
Employees, Sheet Metal Workers, Teamsters, UAW, UBCJA, and UFCW; and
one union-sponsored fund: LongView Fund.
The sponsor category Individual Investor includes 43 different individuals.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Fraction of Votes Cast that Are
in Favor of Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals
During 1994 Proxy Season
Source ofdata: IRRC
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by type of proposal and sponsor. The first row
numbers of each type ofproposal represent mean and median, respectively. The
second row numbers represent standard deviation and N (the number of
proposals), respectively.
Public Private Labor Individual
Type of proposal Institution Institution Union Investor All
.309,.285
(.190,18)
.071,.074
(.020,4)
Internal
Governance
External
Governance
Compensation
Miscellaneous
.309,.285
(.190,18)
.157,.085
(.137,6)
.309,.283
(.127,16)
.244,.263
(.138,74)
.536,.542
(.093,7)
.229,.203
(.171,6)
- .119,.100
(.052,42)
- .134,.145
(.048,3)
.123,.075
(.112,10)
.327,.314
(.173,32)
.062,.042
(.047,16)
.182,140
(.130,132)
.259,.272
(.148,114)
.537,.542
(.093,7)
.128,.096
(.081,52)
.073,.057
(.054,19)
.215,184
(.156,192)
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Table 3, continued
Panel B. t-statistics and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for various pairwise comparisons
by sponsor.
t-statistic Z-statistie
Labor vs. All others 4.68*** 4.10***
Labor vs. Public Institutions 0.35 0.40
Labor vs. Private Institutions 3.51*** 3.44***
Labor vs. Individuals 4.45*** 4.31***
Panel C: t-statistics and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for various pairwise comparisons
by type ofproposal.
t-statistic Z-statistic
Internal governance vs. External governance -4.88*** -3.89***
Internal governance vs. Compensation 7.31*** 5.60***
Internal governance vs. Miscellaneous 10.01*** 5.38***
External governance vs. Compensation 12.30*** 4.21***
External governance vs. Miscellaneous 15.99*** 3.82***
Compensation vs. Miscellaneous 2.74*** 3.47***
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels,
respectively.
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Table 4
Percent of Votes Cast that Are in Favor of
Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Labor Unions and
Identified by ATA as Representing a Conflict of Interest
Between the Unions and Shareholders' Interests in General
Sample limited to internal corporate governance proposals only.
Proposals occurred during 1994 and 1995 proxy season.
Source of data IRRC
Company Proxy Proposal Percent of
Year Votes For
Avondale Industries 1995 Adopt confidential voting 14.6%
Avondale Industries 1995 Repeal classified board 22.9%
Caterpillar 1995 Repeal classified board 48.1%
Caterpillar 1995 Adopt cumulative voting 33.4%
Consolidated Freightways 1994 Repeal classified board 41.6%
Consolidated Freightways 1994 Adopt confidential voting 11.6%
Albertson's 1994 Repeal classified board 28.2%
Albertson's 1994 Adopt confidential voting 23.3%
Average of percent of votes cast for the proposals 28.0%
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Table 5
OLS Regression Results
Estimated coefficients (t-statistics) for regressions of fraction of votes cast that are
in favor of a shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal on sponsor
type, proposal type, and ownership variables.
Dependent Variable =
log[Fraction of votes cast in favor of proposal/(1 - Fraction cast in favor)]
Full Sample
Sample with
Ownership & Data
Independent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Only All Sponsors Labor Only All Sponsors
Intercept
LABOR
PUBLICINST
PRIVATEINST
INTERNALGOV
EXTERNALGOV
MISCELLANEOUS
-2.12 -2.08
(-18.08***) (-17.75***)
0.54 0.56
(3.03***) (3.15***)
0.45
(2.13**)
-0.58
(-2.15**)
0.79 0.71
(5.70***) (5.04***)
1.73 1.67
(4.67***) (4.59***)
-0.74 -0.79
(-3.33***) (-3.60***)
INSTOWN
INSIDEOWN
-2.36 2.25
(-10.86***) (-10.41***)
0.45
(2.27**)
0.48
(2.44**)
0.46
(2.09**)
-0.65
(-2.32**)
0.80 0.73
(5.47***) (4.99***)
1.70 1.66
(4.49***) (4.47***)
-0.81 -0.84
(-3.51***) (-3.72***)
0.58
(1.60)
-0.89
(-1.91*)
0.45
(1.22)
-1.06
(-2.32**)
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Table 5, continued
N
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
(p-value)
192
0.365
28.464
(0.0001)
192
0.392
21.482
(0.0001)
181
0.381
19.485
(0.0001)
181
0.412
16.733
(0.0001)
***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels,
respectively.
Definition of Independent Variables in Table 5 Regression Equation
LABOR
PUBLICINST
PRIVATEINST
INTERNALGOV
EXTERNALGOV
MISCELLANEOUS
INSTOWN
INSIDEOWN
= 1 if the sponsor is a labor union, otherwise 0.
= 1 if the sponsor is a public institution (e.g., a mutual
fund), otherwise 0.
= 1 if the sponsor is a private institution (e.g., a private
pension fund), otherwise 0.
= 1 if the proposal deals with an internal corporate
governance issue, otherwise 0.
= 1 if the proposal deals with an external corporate
governance issue, otherwise 0.
= 1 if the proposal deals with a miscellaneous
corporate issue, otherwise 0.
= fraction of shares owned by institutional holders per
Compact Disclosure and Spectrum.
= fraction of shares owned by insiders per Compact
Disclosure.
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